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B
ritain has the worst record on teenage
motherhood in Western Europe. It is also the
only EU country where the rate has not
decreased in the past 20 years. The UK
figure is nearly three times as high (at around
30 births per 1000 women) as the European
rate (around 11 per 1000).
Early motherhood is commonly associated with lower levels
of education, reduced participation in the labour market and
poverty. The lower income of teenage mothers affects not
only their own but also their children’s economic well-being.
Governments have repeatedly emphasised the importance
of reducing the rate of teenage motherhood, mainly to
reduce the risk of long-term social exclusion and welfare
dependency. The 1992 White Paper “Health of the Nation”
promised to halve the teenage pregnancy rate by the year
2000, a goal now postponed until 2010. However, the rate
of teenage conception has remained stable for the past
decade at 45 per 1000 women, with approximately 40% of
those pregnancies ending in abortion.
The question of interest to policy makers is whether early
pregnancy really has a significant impact on later socio-
economic outcomes, or whether these observed outcomes
are due to other factors. In short, are teenagers who give
birth just like other teenagers except that they are support-
ing a child, or are they different in the first place? If early
motherhood per se leads to poorer outcomes, then policies
reducing early childbearing will have positive effects on the
economic prospects of these young women. However, if
the different adult outcomes are linked to pre-motherhood
differences between teenage mothers and those who delay
childbearing, then the poorer outcomes would surface
regardless. The answer to this question is, therefore,
essential in designing an effective policy to reduce social
exclusion and the transmission of poverty from one genera-
tion to the next.
For our research into this question for the UK we used data
from the National Child Development Study. This is a
continuing survey of all individuals born in Britain during the
first week of March 1958. We took the fifth wave of the
survey, conducted in 1991 when the respondents were 33
years old, and selected a sub-sample of 5,799 women, who
responded to a questionnaire relating to the history of their
fertility. Those who provided information on the outcome of
their first pregnancy and the year in which it happened were
used in the analysis. (See box for details on the data used.)
For our sample, Table 2 gives the proportions (broken down
by teenage pregnancy experience) of those who invested in
post-compulsory education, the highest qualification they
obtained, their labour force status, their total of months
spent in the labour force, their average wage by age 33
and, for mothers, the average number of their children. The
sample size is smaller because of missing information on
by Arnaud Chevalier and Tarja Viitanen
Bychoice
or by chance
What effect does teenage motherhood have on later life?
Arnaud Chevalier and Tarja Viitanen look at the
evidence about the “Class of ’58” to measure the cost of
early pregnancy and its implications for public policy.
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We divided the women in our sample
into four categories: never been
pregnant, mothers/still pregnant in
1991, miscarried and aborted. The year
in which the outcome took place was
misreported in 82 cases and unreported
in another 20, leaving us with a sample
of 5,697 women: of these 1,070 had
never been pregnant, 3,895 were
pregnant for the first time when
answering the questionnaire or had
given birth at the end of their first
pregnancy, 445 had miscarried and 287
aborted (see Table 1).
Unlike most such studies, we
assessed the age at which the
pregnancy started by using the date at
the end of the first pregnancy
(regardless of its outcome), combined
with information on whether the delivery
was late or premature.
Aged 33, nearly 20% of our sample
had never been pregnant. The outcome
of their first pregnancy was affected by
the age at which it took place. More
than 33% of those under the age of 16
terminated their pregnancy by abortion.
This proportion fell to 12% for those
aged 16 to 18 and to less than 4% for
adult women.
We split our sample into women who
gave birth before their 18th birthday,
women who conceived before 18 but did
not give birth, and all other women.
Some, who miscarried or aborted their
first pregnancy, got pregnant again
before their 18th birthday. For this
group, we determined the time and
outcome of their second pregnancy. This
left us with 404 who gave birth as
teenagers, another 99 who conceived
but did not give birth and 5,194 who did
not report being pregnant as a teenager.
The rate of under-18 pregnancy in this
sample reaches 71 per 1000, slightly
higher than comparable estimates for
the UK population.
Table 1 First pregnancy outcomes
Never Currently Birth Miscarriage Abortion Total
pregnant pregnant
Pregnant by 16 – – 58 4 35 97
Pregnant by 18 – – 333 25 48 406
Other 1070 60 3444 416 204 5194
Total 1070 60 3835 445 287 5697
Table 2 Outcome by age 33 by teen fertility group
Birth before 18 Conception, No conception
no birth before 18
Attending post-compulsory education 0.094 0.322 0.446
[328] [87] [4528]
No qualification by age 33 0.149 0.051 0.045
Other and CSE 0.236 0.119 0.125
O level and low vocational 0.308 0.373 0.254
A-level and medium vocational 0.231 0.220 0.279
Degree and high vocational 0.077 0.237 0.297
Months in labour force 55.10 104.45 109.8
(51.05) (59.60) (58.15)
[328] [87] [4528]
Working 0.625 0.713 0.700
[328] [87] [4528]
Pay per hour 3.933 5.047 5.718
(1.595) (2.729) (2.977)
[168] [50] [2493]
Number of children if greater than 1 2.699 2.227 2.052
(1.174) (0.837) (0.828)
[328] [66] [3299]
Note: Mean (Standard deviation) [Number of observations]
Childbearing has a 
clear negative effect on
schooling investment
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Table 3 Post-compulsory education (marginal effects)
Probit IV
Teen mother -0.238 -0.231
(0.036) (0.389)
Father Education 0.021 0.021
(0.006) (0.006)
Mother Education 0.054 0.053
(0.008) (0.008)
Both parents @16 0.074 0.077
(0.029) (0.030)
Nbr. of sibling @16 -0.032 -0.033
(0.006) (0.008)
Mother foreign born 0.133 0.132
(0.052) (0.053)
Father foreign born 0.182 0.181
(0.053) (0.053)
Use of library @10 0.087 0.087
(0.023) (0.023)
Mother interest @7 0.089 0.088
(0.020) (0.022)
Math test @7 0.040 0.040
(0.011) (0.011)
English test @7 0.086 0.086
(0.013) (0.014)
Comprehensive 0.096 0.097
(0.024) (0.024)
Grammar 0.222 0.223
(0.037) (0.037)
Other LEA supported 0.073 0.069
(0.078) (0.076)
Private 0.237 0.238
(0.058) (0.058)
Father SOC professional & manager 0.266 0.260
(0.054) (0.059)
Father SOC 3 non manual 0.176 0.169
(0.058) (0.061)
Father SOC 3 manual 0.128 0.121
(0.052) (0.054)
Father SOC 4 n m 0.112 0.101
(0.091) (0.090)
Father SOC 4 manual 0.058 0.052
(0.057) (0.062)
Financial trouble @16 -0.039 -0.042
(0.037) (0.042)
Peers: quintile 1 -0.147 -0.147
(0.047) (0.048)
Peers: quintile 2 -0.103 -0.104
(0.048) (0.049)
Peers: quintile 3 -0.096 -0.096
(0.048) (0.048)
Peers: quintile 4 -0.016 -0.017
(0.055) (0.055)
Observations 3757 3757
R2 / pseudo R2 0.2288 0.2216
Instrument Menarche
Smith-Blundell Chi2 Pr=.493
Note: Also includes dummies for the observations missing on the following
variables: parental education and location of birth, number of siblings, use of
library, ability test missing, type of school, social class of fathers and social
class of peers’ fathers. Standard error corrected for heterogeneity.
educational achievement and misreporting of labour force
status in 1991.
Childbearing has a clear negative effect on schooling invest-
ment. Only 10% of teenage mothers attended post-compul-
sory education, compared with 45% for other teenagers. This
educational choice made at age 16 had a permanent impact
on the educational attainment of teenage mothers. By the age
of 33, they were three times as likely as those not pregnant in
their teens to have no qualification. At the other end of the
distribution, fewer than 8% of teenage mothers had a degree
or high vocational qualification, compared with nearly 30% for
other women. Women without a teenage motherhood or
pregnancy had almost twice as much work experience by the
age of 33 and were 8 percentage points more likely to be in
the labour force. These combined effects produce a pay
differential of 45% between the two groups of women.
Teenagers who became pregnant but did not give birth have
characteristics common to both groups of women. By
choice or by chance, they did not give birth and, therefore,
faced similar conditions to women who did not give birth as
teenagers. Nevertheless, they tended to be less qualified
and were 13 percentage points less likely to have attended
post-compulsory education than teenagers who did not get
pregnant. Despite similar lengths of experience in the labour
market, by age 33 they earned on average 13% less. These
facts support the view that some of the negative effects
associated with teenage motherhood are in fact due to the
original characteristics of teenage mothers.
We looked at two measures of education: attendance in
post-compulsory schooling and highest qualification obtained
at the age of 33. For those interested in the detail of our
model and the economic techniques used, they are set out
in detail in our CEP Discussion Paper “The Long-Run
Market Consequences of Teenage Motherhood in Britain”.
As with other studies, we included the following in our
factors likely to influence the decision to invest in post-
compulsory education: (1) family characteristics, such as
parental education, family structure, number of siblings,
parental ethnicity (approximated by country of birth), social
class of the father, mother’s interest in child’s schooling and
financial situation at age 16; (2) the child’s academic charac-
teristics (test score in English and maths at age 7 and use of
public libraries at age 10); and (3) social characteristics,
approximated by the type of school attended and the socio-
economic background of the area (measured as the propor-
tion of children with fathers in non-manual occupations in the
school attended). The sample dropped to 4,233 women
because we left out those who reported themselves as
suffering from a long-term illness (48 observations) and
those that did not participate in the third wave of the study at
age 16 (1,416).
Table 3 summarises the results. Unsurprisingly, parental
education, maternal attention, having foreign-born parents
Figure 1 Months of participation in the labour market by age 33
Teen mother
Other mother
1 child
99.5
124.5
2 children
59.9
101.4
More than 2 children
45.6
76.5
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and a better social class were associated with more school-
ing, whereas broken family and a large number of siblings
reduce it. Surprisingly, financial hardship at age 16 did not
seem to affect educational choice. 
Personal characteristics of the child also had the expected
effect: better test scores and the use of public libraries
improved the likelihood of post-compulsory schooling. Peer
effects appear to be important in determining post-compul-
sory schooling decisions: the social environment, as
measured by the social class of the fathers of the child’s
schoolmates, had a significant effect. Being in a school
where fewer than 20% of fathers were in a non-manual
occupation reduced the probability of post-compulsory
education by 15%, compared with a school where more
than 80% of fathers were in a non-manual occupation.
Teenagers who were not in a secondary modern school
were more likely to have attended post-compulsory educa-
tion. This effect was strongest for grammar and privately
funded schools. A teenage mother was 24% less likely to
have invested in post-compulsory education, compared
with other teenagers. Accounting for factors that may influ-
ence both the schooling and motherhood decisions, the
negative effect of teenage motherhood is reduced to 12%
to 17%.
Having children, by increasing the importance and value of
domestic work, had an obvious negative impact on the
length of time spent in the labour force. However, the effect
of teenage motherhood on experience seems ambiguous.
Women who do not bear a child as teenagers are mostly
only deferring their motherhood. Thus, over a whole lifetime,
teenage motherhood could be neutral to work experience.
However, as wages increase throughout the life cycle,
earnings forgone at a later point in life are likely to be larger
than earnings forgone during adolescence. Hence, adult
mothers are less likely to drop out of the labour force than
teenage mothers. So we would expect teenage motherhood
to have a permanent negative effect on work experience.
Our sample here was restricted to mothers only (2,514
observations). Labour market experience is measured as
the total number of months worked since age 16, with part-
time work given a weight of 0.5. Figure 1 gives, for differ-
ent numbers of children, the mean labour market
experience for teenage mothers and for other mothers in
the sample. At each family size, teenage mothers have
significantly less work experience than other mothers.
Teenage motherhood seems to have a permanent effect on
labour market experience, resulting on average in two and
a half years less employment experience. 
Again, it must be observed that the linkage between the
decision to have a child as a teenager and lower labour
market participation may not be causal. If there is some
common link not identified in the data, then the effect of
teenage motherhood on labour force experience would be
biased upwards. In the model, teenage motherhood is
estimated using as identifying variables the age of first
menstruation, the woman’s financial situation at age 16 and
whether she had older siblings (who might play a role
model). The calculations based on this data suggest that
teenage mothers have unobserved characteristics that
make them less attached to the labour market. However,
accounting for this does not remove the previously
measured negative effect of teenage motherhood on
employment: teenage motherhood is associated with a
reduction in labour market experience by age 33 ranging
from 30 to 40 months compared with other mothers.
In analysing women’s wages at age 33, the sample size
dropped to 1,918 mothers, who gave complete information
on earnings and working status. Of these, 1,196 were
working. In this reduced sample, only 134 women had been
teenager mothers, of whom 99 (74%) were working. This
Months 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125
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Table 4 Log hourly pay at age 33
OLS Heckman Double Heckman Double 
selection selection
Selection (1) Selection (2)
Teen mother -0.118 -0.053 -0.102 -0.045 -0.084
(0.037) (0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040)
Other qual. 0.122 0.129 0.117 0.132 0.121
(0.148) (0.161) (0.155) (0.164) (0.155)
CSE 0.025 0.038 0.027 0.041 0.040
(0.048) (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) (0.055)
Vocational 0.086 0.112 0.090 0.116 0.117
(0.048) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055)
O-levels 0.164 0.173 0.159 0.179 0.169
(0.076) (0.082) (0.079) (0.083) (0.079)
Vocational medium 0.094 0.111 0.093 0.112 0.105
(0.048) (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) (0.055)
A-levels 0.096 0.100 0.090 0.104 0.096
(0.066) (0.072) (0.075) (0.073) (0.075)
Vocational high 0.427 0.484 0.441 0.492 0.495
(0.056) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.063)
Degree 0.590 0.621 0.588 0.625 0.614
(0.073) (0.079) (0.072) (0.080) (0.072)
Experience 16-20 -0.095 -0.088 -0.091 -0.084 -0.090
(0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.039) (0.034)
(Exp 16-20)2 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Experience 20-33 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
(Exp 20-33)2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Math test 0.010 0.020 0.010 0.021 0.019
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
English test 0.036 0.030 0.028 0.030 0.023
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Private/public -0.108 -0.108 -0.108 -0.112 -0.110
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Size <25 -0.206 -0.206 -0.203 -0.210 -0.200
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Size 25-99 -0.122 -0.118 -0.119 -0.121 -0.118
(0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.033)
Size 100-499 -0.061 -0.057 -0.057 -0.060 -0.054
(0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034)
Part time -0.125 -0.134 -0.131 -0.131 -0.133
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
IMR: Participation 0.260 0.139 0.296 0.411
(0.045) (0.093) (0.034) (0.131)
IMR: Teen mother 0.067 0.074
(0.035) (0.034)
Constant 1.642 1.454 1.445 1.432 1.278
(0.072) (0.084) (0.116) (0.079) (0.129)
R-squared/log like 0.49 -1576.7 0.49 -1587.7 0.49
Note: Standard error for Kernel-based estimates are obtained by bootstrap (500 replications).
Financial hardship 
at age 16 did not
seem to affect
educational choice
is a significantly larger proportion than for non-teenage
mothers (61%).
As a benchmark, least squares regression estimates are
shown in the first column of Table 4. The model includes the
highest qualifications obtained by age 33, years of labour
force participation (split before and after age 20) and
measures of ability at age 7. Some characteristics of the job
are also included. As expected, more educated mothers
with greater ability, especially in English, earned more than
the others. Teenage participation in the labour force has a
negative effect, as it typically captures the effect of leaving
school early. The effect of adult work experience was less
clear. This is typical of cohort data, where variation in
experience is mostly captured by length of education and,
for women, the number of their children. Teenage mother-
hood had an effect on adult wages over and above the
education and labour force experience. Accounting for
differences in educational attainment and early labour force
participation, women who experienced early motherhood
were paid 12% less than other women.
Again this will be an overestimate if teenage mothers have
characteristics that make them less likely to participate and
less productive. First, we estimate the decision to partici-
pate. Women whose mothers were working when they
were seven were more likely themselves to be working at
age 33, which could reflect a role model played by the
mother. Previous participation had a mixed effect on current
labour market attachment. Mothers who were working at
the age of 16 were 8% more likely to be working at 33, but
those not working at age 23 were 13% less likely to be
CentrePiece Spring 20028
Table 5 Matched estimates of differences in log hourly pay: include control for children
One to One Kernel
Bandwidth=0.01 Bandwidth=0.001 Bandwidth=0.01 Bandwidth=0.001
Teen mother (T=1) 1.294 .293 .284 .294
Other mother (T=0) 1.515 .528 .456 .437
P(T=1)-P(T=0) -0.220 (0.057) -0.234 (0.060) -0.172 (0.044) -0.143 (0.054)
Note: Standard error for Kernel-based estimates are obtained by bootstrap (500 replications)
Table 6 Double selection: teenage mother 
(marginal effects)
Teen motherhood
Math test -0.009
(0.006)
English test -0.009
(0.006)
Parents -0.026
(0.017)
Father SOC prof and manager -0.057
(0.012)
Father SOC 3 non manual -0.034
(0.015)
Father SOC 3 manual -0.012
(0.018)
Father SOC 4 non manual 0.007
(0.038)
Father SOC 4 manual -0.040
(0.013)
Menarche -0.009
(0.004)
Financial trouble @16 0.080
(0.026)
Birth order 0.008
(0.003)
Constant -0.299
(0.478)
Observations 1918
Pseudo R2 0.092
Note: Also includes dummies for the observations missing on father’s social
class. Standard errors are corrected for heterogeneity.
Those who were working at 23 may have postponed childbearing longer
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Arnaud Chevalier is a research fellow at University College
Dublin and a member of the Centre for the Economics of
Education at the CEP.
Tarja Viitanen is a PhD candidate at the University of Warwick.
This article based on their paper “The Long-Run Market
Consequences of Teenage Motherhood in Britain” available from
the CEP (Discussion Paper No. 516).
working. This could reflect differences in the timing of
having children and their age. Those who were working at
the age of 23 may have postponed childbearing longer and
have younger children at age 33 than other mothers.
Variables capturing the opportunity cost of labour market
participation, number of children and marital status were
also included. These variables are often assumed to be
related to the decision to participate in the labour market
and may also be correlated with teenage motherhood.
Compared with having only one child, having two reduced
the probability of labour force participation by 6% (and
having more than two by 19%). By age 33 those who had
been teenage mothers were more likely than other mothers
to be working full-time (49% as against 35%). Thus the pay
differential between women who experienced teenage
motherhood and other mothers cannot be explained by the
so-called “part-time wage gap”. Accounting for selection in
teenage motherhood and labour market participation, the
effect of teenage motherhood on earnings at age 33 is a
penalty reaching 5% to 10% compared with other mothers.
Teenage motherhood, labour force participation and wage
levels are all interacted elements that should be estimated
simultaneously in order to arrive at entirely satisfactory
conclusions. The difficulty of such an approach is in finding
enough valid exclusion variables. Instead, in Table 5, we
present results obtained with matching estimates. The
matching is based on the estimated probabilities of teenage
motherhood, shown in Table 6. As these estimates do not
allow for selection in the labour market, they are probably
biased upwards. They show that teenage mothers suffer a
pay penalty against other women ranging from 14% to 22%,
a significantly higher figure than in previous estimates.
To summarise, our evidence indicates that having a child as
a teenager has dire consequences in terms of post-compul-
sory schooling, long-term labour market outcomes and pay
differentials. Hence teenage motherhood is likely to lead to
the transmission of poverty from one generation to the next.
It would thus appear that policies preventing the long-term
consequences of teenage motherhood should focus first
on helping teenage mothers to achieve their school poten-
tial. The fact that teenage motherhood appears to have a
substantial negative effect, even after allowing for educa-
tional differences, suggests that teenage mothers have
difficulties combining labour market participation and child
rearing. A second focus, therefore, should be on easing
their integration into the labour market. Easy access to
child care and the Working Families Tax Credit are the kind
of promising strategies against the permanent negative
effects of early childbearing that need to be tested for their
cost effectiveness.
Teenage mothers suffer a pay
penalty ranging from 14 to 22%
CentrePiece Spring 200210
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L
ast year, the government gave a commitment to
build or (some would say) rebuild a vocational
route to high-level skills and qualifications in
Britain. This was a recognition that we do not
have the coherent and transparent vocational
route to intermediate and high level skills that, in
other countries, has contributed to raising post-16 educa-
tional achievement.
Apprenticeship was identified as the chosen institution to
form the backbone of this renewed drive to promote post-
16 vocational education and training. More specifically,
Modern Apprenticeship, established in 1994 by the then
Conservative government, was to be the vehicle. It is, there-
fore, appropriate to spell out the standards that would need
to be reached if vocational education in Britain is to become
“the envy of the world”. A comparison with apprenticeship
provision in other European countries where it is success-
fully established would provide a benchmark against which
our Modern Apprenticeship (MA) could be assessed.
We have looked at six countries - three German-speaking
(Austria, Germany and Switzerland) and France, Denmark
and The Netherlands. The German-speaking countries have
a strong “dual system” apprenticeship tradition. At least two
thirds of all their young people embark on apprenticeship
training. France has a much more restricted apprenticeship
tradition; between 10 and 15% enter apprenticeship, but
numbers have grown rapidly in recent years, which makes
it an interesting case for study. Denmark, with a long tradi-
tion of apprenticeship, has seen a rolling programme of
change and reform for the past two decades. The propor-
tion of young people entering apprenticeship has remained
roughly constant: around a third of young Danes gain a
vocational qualification through apprenticeship. The
Netherlands completely restructured vocational education
following legislation in 1996. The decline in apprenticeship
numbers in the 1980s was reversed in the 1990s. Today
around 30% of young people in The Netherlands enter an
apprenticeship programme. In England and Wales the
percentage of a young people starting apprenticeships is
around 9% for Modern Apprenticeship and 11% for
National Traineeships.
To establish our benchmark we examined a number of key
aspects of apprenticeship provision in the six Continental
countries. These were the framework and standards
involved, including the length of training, the content of
programmes, the methods of assessment and the final
standards required. We then looked at the ways in which
apprentice places were provided, how candidates found
them, the educational background of apprentices, the
incentives to enter and stay the course, completion and
success rates and subsequent employment records.
Finally, we looked at how the various national schemes are
managed and financed. Using the findings as a benchmark,
we are able to make a judgement about our own Modern
Apprenticeship scheme. 
The conclusions do not make comfortable reading. In
Britain, in contrast to the other six countries, apprenticeship
is not regulated by national legislation. Instead, regulations
by Hilary Steedman
Are we being serious about
apprenticeship?
“Beyond compulsory school age, we are determined to
build a coherent and high-quality vocational education
and training system that is the envy of the world.” From
Opportunity and Skills in the Knowledge-Driven Economy.
A Final Statement on the Work of the National Skills Task
Force from the Secretary of State for Education and
Employment, 2001
Hilary Steedman looks at on-the-job education in six Continental
countries to find a benchmark against which to judge British policy for
vocational training and finds it seriously wanting.
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and guidelines issued by the Department for Education and
Skills (DfES formerly DfEE) are followed in a variety of ways
in different sectors, leading to wide variations in provision
from sector to sector and locality to locality. Financial flows
in Britain are also more complex than our benchmark
countries. Public funds flow from the budget of the DfES to
the local Learning and Skills Councils (LSCs). The money
is then distributed to training providers, who contract with a
variety of bodies for the provision of apprentice training and
assessment required by DfES regulations. In the process,
equity and transparency are largely lost, so that the funding
devoted to off-the-job training of apprentices can vary from
one local body to another and from one provider to another.
This contrasts sharply with the greater standardisation of
off-the-job training, funding and provision on the Continent
achieved by direct transfers to public sector providers.
In other European countries these offers of apprenticeship
places enable individual firms to signal immediate and antic-
ipated skill needs to young people. Apprenticeship struc-
tures then enable firms to meet those skill needs by
appropriate training in partnership with government. By
offering places, employers provide good quality information
to young people and their parents on future career possibil-
ities. Young people are thereby encouraged to invest in
further education and training in a way that helps to meet skill
needs and improve the probability of future employment.
In Britain, the government practice of target-setting for
apprentices in terms of numbers has led to the side-lining of
employers in favour of “training providers” to whom most
government funding is channelled on condition that they
enable the government to meet its targets. Training providers
then “place” young people with employers with little regard
to local skill needs. The prime advantage of apprenticeship
as a means of signalling skill need and satisfying demand for
skills has thereby been almost entirely dissipated. 
In every other European country, apprenticeship is a recog-
nisable “brand”. Although apprenticeship occupations
differ in various ways, the national framework, underpinned
by binding legislation on key features (duration, standards
and assessment) provides a common identity which allows
the “marketing” of apprenticeship to employers and young
people. In Britain, apprenticeship has no legally defined
identity. This gave rise to wide variations in the administra-
tion of government funding for MA by the Training and
Enterprise Councils until their abolition two years ago.
Variability in duration, standards, achievements and funding
are such that it is impossible to define apprenticeship in
Britain except as “some combination of paid work and train-
ing”. While other factors have contributed, this must be one
of the main reasons for the chronic information failure that
cripples attempts to promote apprenticeship in the UK –
and which has led in the past to apprentices who did not
know they were on apprenticeship schemes and
widespread confusion among employers. 
It is a condition of apprenticeship in the other European
countries that young people in apprenticeship continue to
be educated like their contemporaries within publicly
provided upper secondary education. This requirement
permits a simple and stable pattern of financial flows and
ensures that vocational practice is underpinned by sound
technical knowledge and general education and greatly
facilitates further progression to higher-level vocational
courses from apprenticeship. 
In Britain, lobbying by employers’ organisations in the early
1980s led to the introduction of National Vocational
Qualifications (NVQs) that could be awarded on the basis
of assessment on employers’ premises alone. The same
organisations pressed for the abandoning of any minimum
fixed period for apprenticeship programmes and for NVQ to
be the only qualification to be “aimed for” in government-
sponsored youth training. Employer pressure has continued
to ensure that apprentices in Britain have no entitlement to
education during apprenticeship. 
There is ample evidence that, in a small number of sectors
with a tradition of apprenticeship training, schemes provided
are of good quality and produce well-qualified young people.
But these sectors only account for around 20% of young
people on apprenticeship in Britain today. It is clear that the
Modern Apprenticeship initiative has failed to spread good
practice, as it exists in the traditional sectors, to sectors new
to apprenticeship – such as Health and Social Care,
Customer Service, Business Administration, Hotels &
Catering, Hairdressing and Retailing – which together
account for around half of all apprentice starts in Britain and
for almost all female apprentices. 
This failure only serves to underline the fatal weakness of a
non-statutory framework for apprenticeship, compounded
by a rush to fulfil government targets with little regard to
quality or local skill requirements. But it should not be
assumed that all is well in the “traditional” apprenticeship
sectors where standards are high. Employers in these
sectors are being damaged by the weaknesses of the
scheme as a whole. Well-qualified recruits to apprentice-
ship are difficult to find, information about the excellent
opportunities available to young people in their industries
does not reach its target population and employers are
unable to access government funding for apprenticeship in
areas where total funds available have already been
allocated elsewhere.
In all the other European countries, but not in Britain,
employers’ legitimate concern to minimise costs and
maximise specific training is counter-balanced by other
bodies, which are accorded a compensatory role in the
governance of apprenticeship by the legislative framework.
In the dual-system countries, trade union representatives
perform the essential role of representing the interests of
employees and of apprentices themselves at every level –
local to national – of the apprenticeship structure. In France
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and The Netherlands trade union influence is less important,
but the role of protecting the interests of the apprentice and
of other employees is undertaken by government and by
educational interests.
Apprenticeship has been characterised as a public-private
partnership. In the British “partnership” both trade unions
and government have failed to provide sufficient compensa-
tory counter-balance to the voice of employers in the design
and day-to-day running of apprenticeship programmes.
With only a very few honourable exceptions, mainly in the
“traditional” sectors such as engineering and electrical
contracting, trade unions have done nothing to protect the
interests of young people entering apprenticeship. Unlike
their German counterparts, they have not fought for the
right to education and transferable training and, unlike their
Danish counterparts, they have not upheld the importance
of assessment based on objective evidence.
For successive governments, the work-based training route
has been all but invisible. The result is that apprenticeship
in Britain, judged as a programme, falls short of that
provided elsewhere in Europe on every important measure
of good practice.
The evidence on which this judgement is based is reported
in my paper “Benchmarking Apprenticeship: UK and
Continental Europe Compared” (September 2001). Let us
look at an outline of the main points to emerge.
Take duration for a start. In the German-speaking countries
– Austria, Germany and Switzerland – the length of the
apprenticeship training period for each occupation is fixed
by legislation. The specified period can be shortened in the
case of entrants who hold the Hochschulreife (Abitur) in
Germany or the Maturitt in Austria. In Switzerland, it is
rare for entrants to apprenticeship to also hold a university
entrance qualification. There is also provision in Austria for
the training period to be shortened for those who already
have substantial experience or qualifications in the occupa-
tional area concerned. However, the vast majority of those
who enter “dual-system” apprenticeships in these three
countries follow the apprenticeship training programme for
three or more years. This reflects the fact that apprentice-
ship is understood to be a period of education as well as
of training.
Denmark also has a long-established tradition of appren-
ticeship training based on “dual system” principles. With
effect from 2001 it has reformed and revised apprentice-
ship education and training arrangements and require-
ments. Young people studying for a recognised vocational
qualification will still alternate between periods of study in
college and periods of work in a firm, but the new arrange-
ments stress flexibility and individualisation of training
programmes within a statutory framework. As a conse-
quence, training periods are expressed in terms of
minimum (11/2) and maximum (41/2) years duration. The
typical duration is 31/2 to 4 years. The basic (first part) of
Table 1 Distribution of Apprenticeship Training
Programmes by Duration of Programme,
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland
% of all programmes
2 years and 3 years and 4 years
<3 years <4 years
Austria 10 88 2
Denmark typical
Germany 6 72 22
Switzerland 30 50 20
Sources: 
Switzerland: 
Statistik Schweiz 15. Bildung und Wissenschaft Die Berufslehre in der
Schweiz http://www.statistik.admin.ch.stat_ch/ber15/dlehrvertr_intro.htm 
accessed 21/03/01
Austria:
http://www.bmwa.gv.at/service/leservice/broschde/%FCbersicht2.htm
accessed 21/03.01
Denmark: 
http://www.uvm.dk/pub/2000/newstructure/6.htm accessed on 22/03/01
Germany: 
Berufsbildungsbericht, 2000 2.2 Table 42
In Britain, apprenticeship is not
regulated by national legislation
CentrePiece Spring 200214
the apprenticeship training cannot be completed in less
than 10 weeks of college-based education and the college-
based component of the main (second part) normally has a
maximum limit of 60 weeks. (Table 1 gives the distribution
of apprenticeship training programmes in the dual-system
countries by duration.)
France and The Netherlands are fundamentally different
from the “dual-system” countries with respect to duration. A
significant reform in 1993 in France led to a fundamental
change in the composition of the apprenticeship population.
Previously, the law had only allowed apprentices to get the
lowest level of vocational qualification. Higher level qualifi-
cations were only available through full-time education. As a
result, apprenticeship recruitment was principally from
those who had been unsuccessful in the school system.
Since 1993 apprentices have been permitted to work for all
nationally recognised vocational qualifications, extending to
first degree level and even beyond.
The 1996 reform of vocational education in The
Netherlands required vocational courses to be offered at
four levels and be available through full-time (college) and
part-time (apprenticeship) routes. The structure was
designed to facilitate a switch from one route to the other
without disruption of the study programme. Substantial
amounts of work-based training are required for the full-time
students and not only for apprentices. The clear formulation
of levels of training also allows those on the apprenticeship
route to continue subsequently to a higher level of qualifica-
tion, including vocational courses in Higher Education
(either in apprenticeship or via the full-time route). 
In both France and The Netherlands apprenticeship can
lead to an occupational qualification at a number of different
levels, ranging from the equivalent of the UK NVQ 2 (in The
Netherlands a very small number go no further than an
NVQ1 level) to the equivalent of UK NVQ 5 (France) or UK
NVQ 4 (Netherlands). Those who move from one level to
the next will spend a period of 2+2 or even 2+2+2 years in
apprenticeship. (Table 2 gives the distribution of appren-
ticeship training programmes in France and The
Netherlands by duration as determined by level studied.)
In the UK a fixed training duration is no longer a condi-
tion of public funding of youth training. When Modern
Apprenticeship (MA) was introduced in 1995, duration
was left at the discretion of the employer. In 1998 only
10% of British employers surveyed by the DfEE
expected apprenticeship in their companies to last less
than 18 months. In three sectors, Child Care, Health and
Social Care and Hotels and Catering, between 20 and
25% of all apprenticeships were expected to last for 18
months or less. However, a recent analysis by Fuller and
Unwin shows that the gap between expectation and
actual length of stay in apprenticeship is huge. In four of
the ten largest apprenticeship sectors accounting for
roughly a third of all apprenticeship starts, Health and
Table 2 The Distribution of Participants on
Apprenticeship Training Programmes by
Duration as Determined by Level, France
(1996) and The Netherlands (1999/2000)
NVQ equivalent Level 2 3(a) 4 5
Duration (years): France 2 2 2 2
Duration (years): Netherlands 2-3 2-4 3-4 –
Distribution of Apprentices:
France (%) 64 28 5 3
Distribution of Apprentices:
Netherlands (%)* 55 45 – –
* In The Netherlands 45% are at Levels 3 and 4
In other European countries
apprentices continue to be educated
like their contemporaries
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Social Care, Retailing, Hotels and Catering and
Customer Service, the average actual length of stay in
apprenticeship was less than one year. In all sectors,
average actual length of stay was considerably less than
“expected” and none was longer than two years.
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI), represent-
ing some 250,000 employers, is opposed to fixed train-
ing periods. This opposition must be understood in the
context of employers’ opposition to “time-serving”,
which characterised British apprenticeship in the first
half of the twentieth century, and their determination to
retain control over all aspects of learning in apprentice-
ship. In its response to the government’s 2000 consul-
tation document on Modern Apprenticeship, the CBI
wrote: “Employers are not educators and Modern
Apprenticeships are part of the foundation learning
system – not the education system.” 
All the six continental European countries that we are using
to establish benchmarks require apprenticeship training
programmes to consist of three essential elements: general
education, technical education, and occupational skills and
competences. In the “dual-system” countries, standards of
general and technical education are differentiated by
occupation. It is accepted that some occupations will make
more stringent demands in certain areas of general and
technical education than others. In Germany, Austria and
Switzerland, the regional Ministries of Education and in
Denmark the national Ministry draw up standards in consul-
tation with the industry body responsible for a given
occupational area. There is no attempt to align standards of
general or technical education in apprenticeship with a
wider national standard. 
In France and The Netherlands all apprenticeship
programmes are required to offer general and technical
education components. However, the balance may vary by
occupation and by level. There is an attempt to align
standards across occupational areas and within levels.
Overall in all these six countries, between 70 and 80% of
an apprentice’s training period is spent in the workplace,
including time devoted to workplace training. The balance is
roughly equally between general and more occupationally-
focused technical education.
The distribution of the apprentice training period between
workplace and school or college is thus weighted heavily
towards time spent in the workplace. In all three “dual-
system” countries and in The Netherlands, off-the-job
education and training is ensured through compulsory
attendance at publicly provided vocational colleges or insti-
tutions within the wider upper-secondary school system. In
France, until recently, employers and Chambers of
Commerce were the main providers of off-the-job education
and training for apprentices. However, the curriculum to be
followed and assessment procedures used are identical to
those in full-time publicly provided vocational education. 
A recent innovation in France is provision for apprentices to
attend a publicly funded vocational lyce for their off-the-job
education and training. 
Modern Apprentices in the UK are currently only
required to “work towards” an NVQ qualification at Level
3, although to receive a final certificate of completion
they must obtain the relevant NVQ 3 certificate and
demonstrate competence in Key Skills. The NVQ is a
checklist of occupational competences, demonstrated
and assessed in the workplace. Consequently, the UK
apprenticeship has not, up to now, measured up to the
requirements for separately taught and assessed
technical and general education found in other
European countries.
The government-appointed National Skills Task Force
found the lack of a coherent body of underpinning
knowledge, which characterised the NVQ template,
seriously damaging to the development of Modern
Apprenticeship. The Modern Apprenticeship
Consultation Document put forward a proposal for a
technical certificate to be an additional requirement
alongside the NVQ qualification. This proposal could
bring the balance of learning in the UK Modern
Apprenticeship closer to the structure of that in conti-
nental Europe. However, there is still no recognition by
the government that general education should continue
during apprenticeship.
In our benchmark countries, the successful completion of
apprenticeship is conditional on successful completion of
both elements of the apprenticeship programme: off-the-job
general and technical education and on-the-job acquisition
of skills and competences. General and technical education
is assessed by tests or examinations set and marked by
outside bodies, or by the regional education authorities.
Occupational skills and competences are almost invariably
assessed by practical tests (with external assessors) and
through oral examination (conducted by a panel of asses-
sors). In addition, portfolio evidence is now also used as
part of assessment of practical work.
In the UK, of the two elements of the Modern
Apprenticeship that constitute the full qualification –
NVQ 3 and Key Skills – only Key Skills may be
assessed by examination. There is enormous variation
in the way NVQ competences are assessed and the
extent to which assessors have a financial stake in the
outcome of the assessment. Most apprentices are
assessed on their performance of tasks in the
workplace. UK apprentices are not assessed by objec-
tive methods which promote confidence that consis-
tent standards have been applied, regardless of sector,
occupation or employer. While the employer of an
apprentice may be indifferent to the reliability and
transparency of the qualification awarded, lack of
consistent, objective and reliable assessment lowers
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the labour-market value of the qualification to 
the apprentice.
In all our six countries, responsibility for finding a place as
an apprentice rests with the young person. He or she must
find a willing employer. This places a requirement on the
young person to consider carefully the occupation/sector
that he or she wishes to train for and the type of company
where they would like to work. Since employers will be
recruiting the apprentice with a view to trainability and
productive work, a further requirement is that the aspiring
apprentice should have acquired an appropriate foundation
of skills and aptitudes. These two requirements, prior
consideration of career options and adequate foundation
for training and progress in a work environment, are met in
various ways. 
In the three German-speaking countries, the process
starts in the last two years of compulsory school, when
specific periods are set aside for careers teachers and
visits are arranged to Centres run by the Careers Service.
The Internet now provides additional high quality informa-
tion on careers, the type of work involved, working condi-
tions, skills and aptitudes required. In Germany, for
example, the Chambers of Commerce (Industrie und
Handelskammern) provide sites which list all apprentice-
ship places on offer locally for a range of recognised
occupations. For obvious reasons, demand for appren-
ticeship places in the former East Germany has consis-
tently outstripped supply and there has been government
intervention to subsidise apprenticeship places. In the
former West Germany, demand and supply have been
kept in equilibrium despite rising cohort numbers by
strong government pressure on employers. Overall, the
number of apprenticeship places offered and accepted
annually is still impressive – 630,000 in 1999 – equivalent
to around two thirds of the 16-year-old cohort.
In Austria, where apprenticeship covers a narrower range
of more traditional occupations than in Germany, there has
been a marked fall in the number of places offered. In 1992
nearly half the age group (48.7%) entered apprenticeship;
in 1996 just under two fifths (39.5%) did so. In the early
1990s the supply of places outstripped demand, while by
the mid-1990s the ratio of demand for places from young
people to supply by firms was over 2:1. Improved financial
incentives to firms have resulted in more training places
being offered and the decline in participation in Austria has
now levelled out. A similar situation occurred in
Switzerland, The Netherlands and France in the early
1990s and in all these countries steps were taken to
improvement incentives to firms to offer training places. This
has now resulted in an increase in places offered.
Over the last decade it has proved more difficult in all the
dual system countries to achieve the employer-apprentice
match. There has been no formal raising of entrance
requirements and, in all the German-speaking countries,
there are no formal pre-requisites for entry to apprentice-
ship. But employers having a clear idea of the qualities and
potential needed for successful completion of apprentice-
ship and firms claim that it has been increasingly difficult to
find young people with the qualities and attributes that they
seek among those applying. A number of factors have
contributed. There have been changes in economic activity
and hence in the skill needs of firms and in the type of
occupations offered. But the supply of young people
coming forward has also been modified by the increased
probability that a young person will stay on in full-time
education after the end of compulsory education. It seems
likely, then, that the average ability level of applicants for
apprenticeship has declined to some extent. Combined
with more exacting standards and a more competitive
economic environment, this fall raises the cost to firms of
providing apprenticeship and means that firms are more
reluctant to recruit. 
The German-speaking countries have addressed this
problem from both the supply and the demand side.
Young people who apply for apprenticeship without
success have been encouraged to take pre-vocational or
other full-time courses in post-compulsory colleges. These
courses revise and consolidate basic skills and provide
additional preparation for entry to the work environment.
Around 10% of entrants to apprenticeship in Germany in
1998 had followed such courses. In Germany, the
average age of apprentices has increased markedly, from
16.6 years in 1970 to 18.2 years in 1985 and 19.1 years
in 1998. This suggests that those entering in 1998 were,
on average, aged around 18.
Denmark has seen some decline in numbers entering
apprenticeship. Nevertheless, just over a third of any age
cohort currently enters apprenticeship training
programmes. An innovation is that this final year can be
spent partly in school and partly in vocational college. Thus,
as in Germany, entrants to apprenticeship are likely to be
aged at least 18. Those opting for the vocational route to
qualifications also spend between 10 and 60 weeks
(average 20 weeks) full-time in the equivalent of a College
of Further Education on what is called the Basic
Programme. In this programme, basic and vocational
subjects are supplemented by educational and occupa-
tional guidance and counselling. The student can “sample”
various vocational areas and decide on a suitable vocational
route. Those with definite choices of occupation can “fast-
track” through the basic programme. Before starting on the
main part of the vocational programme (typical duration 3 to
31/2 years),the student must find an employer willing to enter
into an apprenticeship agreement. The vocational college
plays an important part in this process through links with
employers by means of the local Trade Committees
(employer/employee organizations). If a student fails to find
an apprenticeship place, the college may offer a “virtual
place” and the student will cover the required occupational
skills in the college. Currently around 6% of apprentices in
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expanded dramatically. The young person seeking an
apprenticeship may visit a local advisory centre for young
people (PAIO), the local office of the national careers
guidance organisation (ONISEP), the local Chamber of
Commerce (representing local employers offering appren-
ticeships), or the local Centre for Apprenticeship Training
(CFA). On the Internet, a rich range of well-presented infor-
mation is available. 
For example http://www.apprentissage-paca.tm.fr/ is a site
provided by the Regional government of the Provence-
Alpes-Cote d’Azur Region. Regional governments now
have much of the responsibility for promoting apprentice-
ship in France and the web site given above provides step-
by-step information for employers and young people in the
region. The official site http://www.cidj.asso.fr provides
detailed descriptions of a wide range of recognised
occupations, associated qualifications and ways of studying
for them, including apprenticeship. The aspiring apprentice
is encouraged to seek out an employer willing to take on an
apprentice. The steps to be taken to enter apprenticeship
are quite challenging and set out on the web page of eg
http://apprentissage-paca.tm.fr without many concessions
to youth and inexperience. 
In The Netherlands, students look for apprenticeship places
themselves, mostly with the support of colleges.
Apprenticeship places must be accredited by the national
sector bodies for vocational education and training.
Information about apprenticeship places is available from the
Internet (www.edugate.nl) or from the sites of the national
bodies (www.colo.nl). The national sector bodies have the
task of ensuring that sufficient companies and organisations
are in place so as to be able to provide the necessary
number of training places. The national bodies also ensure
that quality of on-the-job and off-the-job vocational practice
complies with the quality standards set for each sector. In
The Netherlands some 150,000 active training companies
are recruited and registered as apprentice companies. In
order to be legally enforceable, the apprenticeship contract
must be signed by the student, the school, the apprentice
company and the national sector body. 
In Britain, there is no systematic provision for introduc-
ing students in schools and colleges to career opportu-
nities offered by apprenticeship. Furthermore, there is
no website available at national, regional or local level
which provides comprehensive information on appren-
ticeship by occupation or sector, together with links to
sites giving details of employers offering apprentice-
ships or to other ways of accessing provision.
While a small minority of apprentices in Britain enter
apprenticeship by applying directly to an employer, for
example in answer to an advertisement, most are
channelled through local Learning and Skills Councils
(LSCs) (formerly Training and Enterprise Councils) and
are directed to a “training provider”. In England alone,
Denmark have places provided in this way by a college. The
apprentice will alternate periods in the workplace and
periods in college and be required to follow courses which
amount (maximum) to 60 weeks of full-time study over the
3-31/2 year training period. 
The aspiring apprentice in France is less likely to have been
prepared for the choice of an apprenticeship occupation
while at school. The guidance process in French secondary
schools (collges) is normally restricted to outlining the
routes that 16-year-olds can follow through the education
system and the qualifications that can be obtained. This
sharp division has its roots in the distinction made in French
society between the public and private sectors. The educa-
tion system is seen as a pillar of the public sector, while
apprenticeship has traditionally been supported and
provided by the private sector, most notably by French
employers. French employers and those who work within
the structures of apprenticeship complain in terms similar to
those of their counterparts in the UK of the lack of status of
apprenticeship and the perception that apprenticeship is
only for the rejects of the school system. That was undoubt-
edly the situation for many years when the number of
apprentices in France remained small (around 200,000 a
year), mostly in artisan trades and occupations. However,
since a number of changes were made to the laws govern-
ing apprenticeship – including allowing apprentices to
obtain the whole range of educational qualifications up to
and including Masters degrees – apprenticeship has
Apprenticeship has been characterised
as a public-private partnership
there are some 1,330 training providers. Of these, just
under 20% are employers. About 30% are private
companies and a further 20% are Further Education
Colleges. The remainder are Chambers of Commerce,
Group Training Associations, local authorities and not-
for-profit providers. Only around 5% of all apprentices
are directly recruited and trained by employers. The
remainder are the responsibility of the training provider,
who contracts with the LSC to find an employer willing
to take the young person. Frequently, most of the train-
ing and assessment is carried out by the provider rather
than by the employer where the apprentice is based.
The process of employing an apprentice differs from
country to country. In the three German-speaking countries,
employers will either have had personal experience of 
being an apprentice and will almost certainly have a
substantial number of employees who have obtained an
apprenticeship certificate. Especially in Germany, such
employers will not be confined to the smaller artisan-type
firms. Apprenticeship, followed by full-time technical study,
is a recognised route into management in Germany. 
In France, although apprenticeship is largely provided by
the private sector, it is nevertheless heavily regulated by
French law. The procedure that a French employer must
follow to take on an apprentice (set out with great clarity on
the apprentissage-paca website) is not for the faint-hearted.
However, French employers are used to detailed legal
regulation of employment relations and it is possible that the
requirements seem to them less daunting than they might to
a British counterpart. As in Germany, the local Chamber of
Commerce and the local Centre de Formation des
Apprentis (CFA) help to put employers in touch with young
people seeking an apprenticeship. 
In The Netherlands, in order to train an apprentice, a
company must be assessed and accredited by the appro-
priate national sector body. It must be sure that the appren-
tice will carry out appropriate tasks, that the company is
providing a trainer/supervisor for the student and allowing
the necessary time and facilities. If a student cannot person-
ally find an apprenticeship place, the vocational college
involved must do so.
In Britain, the complexities of the funding regime associ-
ated with apprenticeship are widely recognised as being
too complex for most employers to manage. Training
providers have filled the gap. However, they are in turn
driven by funding incentives that derive from government
targets for numbers of young people placed in govern-
ment-supported training. Depending on the particular
funding regime adopted by each TEC, funding may bias
training towards low-cost provision, which does not
necessarily correspond to local skill need. Once the
government targets have been met (and funding
committed), additional employers wishing to take on an
apprentice have been refused adequate funding. 
How do incentives to enter apprenticeship compare? The
German system attracts young people by a combination of
negative and positive incentives. Similar incentive structures
pertain in the other German-speaking countries. There are
no absolute barriers to the employment of unqualified
school leavers in Germany, but firms are barred from
employing people under 18 in the wide range of occupa-
tions for which an apprenticeship programme exists.
Effectively, employment opportunities for under-18s are
limited to unskilled occupations. As a result only about 1 or
2% of the cohort is in employment at age 16 or 17. Given
the attractive range of occupational training open to young
people, this means that the youth labour market is of limited
attraction to school leavers. A second negative incentive is
the length of university degree courses and their high
dropout rate, which deter some of the more academic
students from applying to university and cause them to
choose apprenticeship instead. 
Even more important is the recognition accorded to the
apprenticeship qualification. Whatever the occupation, a
completed apprenticeship confers a professional identity
and consequent social status. Many collective agreements
confine access to technician and Meister status to those
who have completed the relevant apprenticeship. In the
Handwerk (artisan) sector, the apprenticeship certificate is
a necessary condition for independent practice and appren-
ticeship followed by a period of full-time professional educa-
tion is a recognised route to management in many
CentrePiece Spring 200218
On the Continent, the Internet now provides
additional high quality information on careers
industries. But the social and career recognition of the
apprentice depend on the passing of the final examinations.
The combination of these negative and positive incentives
explains why nearly two thirds of young Germans enter
apprenticeship. A substantial proportion of all those with
school leaving qualifications equivalent to 5 GCSE Grades
A-C (Realschulabschluss) choose apprenticeship in
Germany, whereas in the UK most of their counterparts
would normally aim for university entrance. 
The negative incentives arising from the strict German
labour market regulation relating to occupational qualifica-
tion are not present in Denmark, France and The
Netherlands to the same extent. University courses, while
longer than in the UK, are not as long as in Germany.
Furthermore, a more developed full-time route to vocational
qualifications at Levels 3/4 exists in these countries (and, to
a lesser extent in Austria), which restricts the range of
occupations for which apprenticeship can prepare. In all
these countries efforts have been made to improve the
attractiveness of apprenticeship to more academically able
students by improving links and bridges to the range of
qualifications available from full-time education. 
In France, state regulations have always prescribed that
apprentices must study for nationally recognised vocational
qualifications that are the same as those awarded in full-
time education. While the proportion of those getting higher
levels qualifications through apprenticeship remains
relatively small, it has undoubtedly contributed to the recent
strong growth in apprenticeship numbers and done much to
raise its status.
In Denmark, apprenticeship programmes have been
modularised and the “catalogue” of available courses
aligned with those in adult education. Programmes have
been individualised to make them more attractive and to
reduce dropout. Thus students can now complete study
programmes over variable time periods within set minima
and maxima. Higher level vocational courses provided
within the framework of higher education are specifically
tailored for graduates from apprenticeship. 
In The Netherlands, students on vocational courses study
for the same vocational qualification, whether on appren-
ticeship or on full-time courses. Substantial amounts of
work-based training are required for both full-time students
and for apprentices. Switching between apprenticeship and
the full-time route is, therefore, easier. The clear formulation
of levels of training (see Table 2) also allows those on the
apprenticeship route to continue subsequently to a higher
level of qualification (either via apprenticeship or the full-
time route). Perhaps for these reasons The Netherlands has
a particularly high proportion of mature entrants to appren-
ticeship. In 1998 only 37% of apprentices were between
15 and 19 years old, 47 % were aged between 19 and 27,
12% between 28 and 40 and 4% were over 40.
ar from being improved, in Britain the incentives to follow
apprenticeship programmes have been reduced. One of
the main attractions of apprenticeship to young people –
the ability to “earn while you learn” – has been under-
mined by the progressive introduction of the Educational
Maintenance Allowance for young people in full-time
education. The initiative to establish a technical certifi-
cate as part of the apprenticeship qualification was
floated without much thought for how it might promote
progression to proposed new degree level qualifications
(Foundation Degrees). At the same time, the pool of
well-qualified (5 or more GCSEs Grades A-C) potential
applicants for apprenticeship has been drained by the
rapid expansion of places in higher education.
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A
ll the world’s major equity markets are now
above the levels at which they stood before the
tragic events of September 11 last year. They
seem to be reflecting the consensus forecast
that an economic recovery will begin in the
United States by the middle of 2002.
Despite a succession of surveys in the second half of 2001,
which suggested a significant weakening of confidence in
the future in both the US and in Europe, and despite
September 11 and its consequences, the markets appear
to be willing to “look through” the valley in earnings associ-
ated with recent economic weakness to the sunlit uplands
that are expected to result from the significant monetary and
fiscal stimulus that has been injected. Traditionally, stock
markets bottom before recessions end, so it is not that
unusual to have weak business confidence and stock
market rallies co-existing. The key question, though, is
by Dr Sushil Wadhwani
long term...
Did the dramatic falls in equity prices in 2001 herald
the start of a new bull market? Sushil Wadhwani
looks at past evidence and finds that expectations
remain high by historic standards.
Figure 2 US and Euro Area Non-Manufacturing Prices
Euro area prices
US NAPM prices
whether the markets are right to expect an economic recov-
ery in the US by then.
The equity markets appear to be relying on a significant
recovery in profits this year. For example, the Institutional
Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) consensus is for a 14.4%
increase in operating earnings by 2002. Not only is this
forecast dependent on an economic recovery, but it also
assumes that profits will rise significantly faster than GDP.
Yet firms have little power to raise prices as capacity utili-
sation is at an 18-year low and nominal GDP growth has
slowed to just under 2% per year. On the other hand,
unemployment is still low by long-term historical standards
and workers appear to be able to secure real wage
increases significantly in excess of productivity growth. This
implies a squeeze on profitability, because firms are likely to
respond by scaling back on their investment and employ-
ment plans, which could then feed back into consumption.
Figure 1 US and Euro Area Manufacturing Prices
Euro area prices
US NAPM prices
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Figures 1 and 2 display the responses to questions on
pricing embedded in recent Purchasing Managers’ Index
(PMI) surveys. They point to inflation pressures being
extremely low. (NB on the right-hand scale 50 reflects the
“no change” level.) Both manufacturing and services are
now in deflation territory. Note also that the price of oil and
industrial metals fell by around 20% last year. In addition,
capacity utilisation in the US and Japan has not been lower
since the early 1980s. For all these reasons, it is likely that
global inflation will remain low over the next year or so. 
Against this background, the key question is whether
current stock market valuations pose a risk to the global
economy. Global stock markets have fallen significantly
since their peaks in 2000. Table 1 shows that the declines
in the major equity indices from their peak values have
ranged from over 20% for the FTSE100 to around 60% for
the NASDAQ. It is, therefore, tempting to believe that stock
markets are now more likely to rise than fall again.
Normally, the bottoms of bear markets are associated with
clear signs of the purging of the excesses that built up
during the euphoria associated with the preceding bull
market. However, Figure 3 shows that the current
price/earnings ratio for the S&P500 index in the US remains
high by long-term historical standards. While it is true that
current earnings are at cyclically depressed levels, Figure 4
(computed using a 10-year moving average of past
earnings) suggests that the market is still trading at a
relatively high multiple of earnings. These high absolute
valuations have led some commentators to argue that the
US stock market is still vulnerable to a further significant
decline. If they are right, this could have an important
impact on global growth.
It must be noted that P/E ratios have been high by histori-
cal standards for some years. Several Wall Street strate-
gists have argued that these higher levels have been
appropriate because interest rates and inflation have been
low, so that holding equities has become less risky. So let
us look further into this equity valuation debate.
Consider a simple valuation model for stock prices
DY+g = r+rp
where DY = dividend yield, g = expected long-term, real
growth rate of dividends, r = real interest rate, and rp =
Table 1 Stock Market performance since the peak
FTSE100 S&P500 DAX CAC NIKKEI NASDAQ EUROSTOXX
Peak 6930.2 1527.5 8046.0 6922.3 50833.2 5048.6 466.2
15 Nov 2001 5238.2 1142.2 5006.3 4577.3 10489.9 1900.6 307.5
% change –24.4 –25.2 –37.8 –33.9 –49.6 –62.4 –34.0
Figure 3 S&P500 Price-Earnings Ratio
(Trailing Earnings)
Figure 4 S&P500 Price-Earnings Ratio
(Ten Year Average of Earnings)
Source: Shiller dataset for 1871-1968,
thereafter S&P Composite P/E ratio
Source: Shiller dataset for 1871- early 2001
The market is still trading at a relatively
high multiple of earnings
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equity risk premium. (This is known in the literature as
Gordon’s (1962) growth model and is just a steady-state
version of the dividend discount model.)
In the US last November, when the S&P500 index was
1142, DY was 1.4% and r was 3.3% (i.e. the yield on US
Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities). We can initially
assume that g was 2%, which is approximately equal to the
long-term average growth rate of real dividends in the US
from 1926 to 2000. These figures yield an estimate of the
equity risk premium (ERP) of 0.1%, which is extraordinarily
low by long-term historical standards. The actual ERP
between 1926 and 2000 was about 7% and some calcula-
tions of the ex ante estimates of ERP for the same period
suggest a value of around 4%. It is a widely held view that
the appropriate level of the ERP has fallen since World War
II and some estimates of the ex ante risk premium suggest
that it has averaged around 2.4% since 1965. However,
even if one just assumed that the ERP needed to rise from
its present level to 2.4%, that would imply that the dividend
yield would have to jump from 1.4% to 3.7%, which in turn
would imply a very significant decline in the S&P500,
indeed to around 430! Fortunately, the above analysis
needs to be qualified.
There is significant variation in the rate of productivity
growth over time, i.e. although the long-term growth rate of
labour productivity in the US is about 2% a year, there have
been significant periods when actual productivity growth
has been maintained at a rather higher level. For example, it
averaged nearly 3% a year from 1948 to 1973 and just
under 4% from 1917 to 1927. Given that US productivity
growth appears to have accelerated in the mid-1990s, it is
reasonable when valuing stocks to allow now for at least a
period of above-average dividend growth. Here it is to be
noted that analysts had become significantly more
optimistic about medium-term earnings growth prospects
during the last two decades. Figure 5 displays the consen-
sus forecast for real earnings growth three to five years
ahead. This rose from around 8% a year in the mid-1980s
to a peak of almost 16% a year in 2000, though it has fallen
back to around 12% a year now.
If one assumes that the longer-term earnings growth
forecasts are an accurate guide for the next four years and
that the economic growth rate will gradually diminish
towards its long-term average of 2% a year over, say, an
eight-year period, then the implied ERP today is around
2.7% (see Figure 6). (Incidentally, for the period where
such data on long-term earnings expectations have been
available, there is a no evidence of these expectations being
biased. This is in contrast to the data on expectations of
earnings one year ahead, where analysts appear to have
been over-optimistic.)
This kind of calculation actually makes the US stock market
today look undervalued. Achieving an ex ante risk premium
of 2.4% on this basis would imply a rise in the S&P500
Figure 5 Consensus expectations of S&P500
Real Earnings Growth
Figure 6 Implied ERP*
Note: IBES nominal earnings expectations deflated by University
of Michigan survey based on 5-10 year inflation expectations.
* Computed using 3 stage Dividend Discount Model
based on long-term earnings expectations.
Figure 7 UBS Paine Webber/Gallup Survey of
Expected Returns
Next ten years
Next 12 months
There is a significant variation in the rate of
productivity growth over time
average since 1986
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index to around 1285. In fact, the post-1985 average for the
implied ERP is even lower (2.1%), which would support an
even higher implied value for the S&P500.
At first sight, one might take some comfort from the fact that
the ERP appears to have risen from around 0.5% at the
market peak in 2000 (see Figure 6) to a value above its
post-1985 average. However, in the last long bull market
investors increased their expectations of equity returns. It is
important that investor expectations for returns on the stock
market should be consistent with the ERP. Specifically, with
long-term bond yields of around 4.75%, an ERP of 2.5%
implies a long-term return on equities of 7.25% a year. This
level of return is, though, considerably lower than what
investors say they expect to earn. 
Specifically, the UBS Paine Webber/Gallup poll of investor
attitudes asks individuals to forecast the annual rate of
return on the stock market over the next 10 years. The
October 2001 survey suggested an expected annual return
of around 15%! Figure 7 shows that the expected return
has fallen a little (it was as high as 19% a year in December
1999), but it remains more than twice as high as is implied
by the current constellation of interest rates, ERP and
expectations of earnings growth. The mismatch between
what the stock market is likely to deliver and what individual
US investors expect is a potential source of concern about
the medium-term viability of existing valuations.
Of course, the recent bear market has had some impact on
expected returns. In the last two years, while expected
returns one year ahead have fallen significantly, 10-year
forecasts have moved relatively little (see Figure 7).
Individual investors appear to believe that the current bear
market is only going to have a relatively temporary effect on
the path of equity returns. Their longer-term expectations for
returns are still extraordinarily high by historic standards.
A related concern about possibly over-exuberant expecta-
tions is associated with the fact that analysts still expect
earnings growth over the next four years to average almost
15% a year in nominal terms, or around 12% in real terms.
In the long term, earnings growth must match GDP growth
and not even the most ardent advocate of the New
Economy in the US believes that the economy is likely to
grow faster than 4% a year. Since 1875, a rate of real
earnings growth of 12% a year over a four-year period has
been exceeded only about 10% of the time. Hence, the next
four years would have to be unusually good in terms of
corporate earnings growth in order to match the expecta-
tions of analysts. 
While this is possible, it is not particularly reassuring that
the current optimism of stock market pundits is predicated
on such a rare level of growth. Further, the 2.7% estimate
of the current ERP is based on a three-stage dividend
discount model, where real earnings growth only falls from
its elevated level gradually over the next four years. I have
implicitly assumed an average growth rate of real earnings
of around 8.2% a year over the next 12 years. Yet, as
Figure 8 shows, this has been a very unusual event during
the last 125 years. To be precise, this rate of earnings
growth has only been exceeded about 1% of the time.
Thus, although global stock markets fell significantly from
the peaks of 2000, it is not as yet possible to assert that all
the previous “excesses” have been purged. However, if
clear signs of an economic recovery do emerge, none of
these “excesses” are necessarily inconsistent with a signif-
icant move up in equity prices in the short term. It behoves
us to recall that equities rallied by almost 60% in the 17
months following the lows reached in October 1998, even
though levels of the ERP and long-term earnings expecta-
tions were not significantly different from today’s. Valuation
considerations only matter on a longer-term basis. An
economic recovery producing a significant bounce in profits
and share prices is unlikely to lead anyone to question their
current, longer-term expectations about earnings and equity
returns.
If, on the other hand and for whatever reason, the recovery
is delayed, then we might see an adjustment as investors
come to re-evaluate their expectations about longer-term
earnings growth and returns and this could have a signifi-
cant impact on the outlook for growth and inflation.
So far as forecasting inflation in the UK is concerned, we
also face significant uncertainties in relationship to the
supply potential of the economy. Most existing macroeco-
nomic forecasting models produce forecasts of inflation
that depend on some assessment of demand pressures
relative to supply potential. In practice, however, assessing
the true degree of supply potential is very hard. We have
had to make some difficult judgments about, among other
things, the level of spare capacity and the degree of
Figure 8 Real Earnings Growth 
(12 year Average Growth Rate)
In the long term, earnings growth
must match GDP growth
growth = 8.2%
need to investigate alternative conceptual measures of this
stock. More generally, the evidence that prices have in fact
been below what the equation predicts is consistent with
the growth rate of potential output being higher than we
have assumed. 
It is also the case that the equation does not currently
allow the world price of competitor goods to influence
domestic pricing and, thereby, potentially fails to pick up
any effects from the intensification of competitive pressure
that has occurred as the ratio of world prices to domestic
prices has fallen in recent years. (There is survey evidence
that an intensification of competitive pressures since mid-
1997 has been perceived to have had an important effect
on profitability.) 
It may be that we need to revisit the conceptual measure
of capacity utilisation that is used in the model. In any
case, while there are considerable uncertainties, my
personal judgment is that the current published best
collective projection for the UK economy is systematically
overstating the degree of inflationary pressure, though
only by around 0.5%. 
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competitive pressure. One way of assessing whether our
assumptions about these key, but hard-to-measure,
variables are appropriate is to look at the performance of
the equation that helps predict prices that is embedded in
the Bank of England’s Medium-Term Macro-econometric
Model (MTMM).
There has been a tendency since about 1998 for actual
prices to turn out to be below what the MTMM equation
predicted. These errors have been both economically and
statistically significant. Much of the “art” of forecasting lies
in the judgments that are made. Different assumptions
about whether or not these post-1998 errors would persist
can have a large effect on the inflation forecast. If one
assumes that they are relatively transient, then the forecast
would tend to follow the prediction produced by the
equation. If, instead, one felt that the factors that explain
these errors were likely to endure, then this could lead to a
significantly different inflation forecast.
In deciding what assumptions are appropriate, we have to
take into account the upward revisions to the historical
capital stock data that were unveiled by the Office of
National Statistics (ONS) in September 2001. The new
measure of the capital stock had a significant effect on the
MTMM measure of capacity utilisation.
This new measure has the inherent plausibility of being
rather closer to the survey data and implies that we are
operating below full capacity. The previous measure implied
that we were operating above full capacity. The revised
calculation of capacity utilisation has the considerable
advantage that it reduces the size of the previous price
forecasting errors. One is normally more confident about
projecting the future when one understands the past better.
Since this alternative explanation of past price forecasting
errors is of a more enduring character, it has had the effect
of reducing the medium-term inflation forecast produced
mechanically by the model. 
Moreover, even though the new capital stock data produce
smaller forecast errors from the price equation, there is still
some tendency to over-predict price inflation since 1998.
And these forecasting errors are still economically signifi-
cant. If, for example, we project into the future the average
forecast error for inflation made over the post-1998 period,
then in a mechanical sense Figure 9 shows that the implied
path for inflation would have been quite different from what
was published by the Bank of England in its November
2001 Inflation Report, with a difference in the inflation
projection for two years ahead being much as 1.8 percent-
age points. Of course, fortunately, the published inflation
forecast is not just based on an econometric model.
This suggests that there may still be important missing or
poorly measured variables in the MTMM price equation.
Candidate explanations include the possibility that the
capital stock remains inadequately measured. We still
Figure 9 Alternative ‘Inflation Forcasts’
Nov IR
Average 97 – 01Q2
Average 98 – 01Q2
Dr Sushil Wadhwani is a member of the Monetary Policy
Committee of the Bank of England and a Visiting Professor at the
London School of Economics. 
This article is an edited extract from a speech delivered to the
Edinburgh University Economics Society on 21 November 2001. 
In practice, assessing the true degree of
supply potential is very hard
CentrePiece Spring 200226
G
ood people management costs no more than
bad people management. It is an idea whose
time has finally come”, wrote the journalist
Simon Cauklin in People Management last
August. 
This judgement is based on an assumption that human
capital is now central to competitive advantage. It is
founded on a spate of recent studies, both in the US and
the UK, showing a positive relationship between sophisti-
cated human resource management and corporate
performance. This benevolent system is being labelled
“high performance management”.
An earlier article by one of us (“Putting the cart before the
horse: how can we be sure about the management revolu-
tion?”, CentrePiece Spring 2000) questioned whether the
claims for this research and the coining of a new label were
justified. It particularly noted that there were many strands to
the argument and that there was great diversity within the
research. Subsequently, using the 1998 UK’s Workplace
Employment Relations Survey (WERS98), we have been
able to test many of these diverse arguments. The results
suggest that some of the scepticism is justified. However,
they support a key feature of one of the strands – that a core
set of “high involvement” practices concerned with changing
the way people work are being used in concert. This reflects
an orientation on the part of management towards involving
and developing the workforce. Moreover, this high involve-
ment management does have an effect on a key perform-
ance variable, the rate of productivity change. Organisations
that practise high involvement management are also more
likely to deliver both high quality and high productivity. 
Others have also been uneasy with the elevation of human
resource management (HRM) to the status of the key to
high performance. First, there are those who question the
very idea of a “best way” of managing people that can fit all
contexts. Second, there are those who point out that a
strategic and employee-centred approach to human capital
management conflicts with the short-term financial criteria
that stock markets bring to bear on managements, particu-
larly in an Anglo-Saxon context. Third, there are those who
think that HRM generates profitability not because it is a
benevolent form of management but because it is just
another means of making workers work harder. 
Our scepticism, however, is directed more at the claims
that there is sufficient uniformity in the studies to justify the
high performance management label. First, the nature of
what is taken to be the good HRM varies between studies
and is often not clearly identified in them. Second, the
results of the performance effects of HRM (however
conceived and measured) are neither as clear-cut nor as
uniform as some have concluded. Even within studies,
there is often unevenness in the results as between 
by Stephen Wood, Lilian de Menezes and Ana Lasaosa
Quality time
Stephen Wood, Lilian de Menezes and Ana Lasaosa examine
evidence on the impact of High Involvement Management and conclude
that with it employers can raise the rate of productivity growth and
simultaneously achieve high levels of both quality and productivity.
Ò
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different performance measures. While some results point
to universal effects, others do not.
There are common starting points in the research. The first
is the notion, implied by the term HRM, that employees
should be considered as a resource rather than a cost. The
second is the emphasis on HRM practices designed to
enhance the involvement of employees in their work in the
belief that they harness people’s energies and commitment
towards organisational goals. (Various terms were coined
for this perspective, including high involvement, high
commitment and, most recently, high performance
management.) The third is the contrast between high
involvement management and the style of human resource
management based on narrow and tightly specified job
definitions. To illustrate the difference, high involvement
management assumes that gains will accrue from invest-
ment in training and development, rather than from limiting
training costs to meet immediate needs, as in the control
model; from empowering employees (through enrichment,
introducing self-managing teams and encouraging subordi-
nate participation), rather than from simplifying and closely
specifying job requirements; and from ensuring good
communications up and down the organisation, rather than
from limiting information to a need-to-know basis.  
Yet beneath these common elements in the research there
are differences. The most pronounced is between a focus on
sophisticated personnel management practices and on a
more specific high involvement management, the core of
which is changes in job design. These two approaches
overlap, because personnel management includes work
organisation practices, which in turn entail the use of person-
nel policies for their success. But they imply quite different
notions of the high performance human resource system.
The first notion treats it as the set of best practices for each
area of personnel management. The second implies that it
pivots on a set of practices, designed to encourage all
employees to work flexibly and creatively: for example,
functional flexibility, team working, quality circles and
suggestion schemes. From the “best practice” perspective,
the greater the number of the best practices used in the
organisation the greater will be its performance. The issue
then is whether each practice has an equal effect, or
whether the effect of all or some is dependent on the
existence of others. For example, will the effect of sophisti-
cated selection processes be minimal if, once in the organ-
isation, employees are then managed with practices that
are not state of the art? Or is the main effect of a good
selection process that it produces a workforce so commit-
ted and skilled that it is unaffected by other less good
management practices? 
A secondary issue is whether the effect of these good
practices is dependent on the extent to which an organisa-
tion has a strategic approach to personnel. Is the effect of
sophisticated personnel practices limited, if they are not
underpinned by a strong personnel function, where human
resource management is accorded a key role in determin-
ing the overall strategy of the firm and is integrated with day-
to-day line management? 
In the other high involvement management perspective, the
key is a set of core (work design) practices. However, as
their design and concerted use is evidence of an underlying
management orientation in favour of involving and develop-
ing their workforce, that in itself becomes part of the
equation. The issue then is the extent to which the perform-
ance effects of this core are dependent for their maximum
impact on the existence of supporting personnel and
employment practices. A secondary issue here is whether
the successful adoption of HIM depends on the use of
practices associated with total quality management or what
is know as “lean production”.
The two perspectives also have differing implications for
research design. Under the best practice approach,
practices are defined on the basis of leading edge theory
and/or empirical investigation of their effects. The extent to
which (and in what way) this bundle effects performance
can then to be tested empirically. Typically, this has involved
correlating the number of practices used with various
performance outcomes. This assumes that the effects of
practices are equal and, in combination, additive. Other
tests can then be conducted to see if the picture is more
complicated, i.e. to discover whether practices are mutually
reinforcing, or whether the effects of individual practices
used alone are limited or even negative. 
Research into the high involvement perspective requires,
first, an empirical investigation of the practices involved to
assess whether they are in fact used in concert and
whether their use is indicative of an underlying management
orientation. Then, if their use is found to be systematic,
measures of that usage or of the underlying orientation can
be correlated with performance to see if they are linked.
Co-existence of practices is crucial here. For, without it,
high involvement management is not a meaningful concept
in practice. It remains simply a part of the discourse of
management thought, not of reality: the practices are simply
being used in an ad hoc way.
Our research has concentrated on the second perspective.
Its starting point is the following conception of high involve-
ment management:
n it is a task-centred approach to participation
n it involves (a) the combined use of managerial
practices, such as quality circles, job flexibility, and
team working and (b) an orientation on the part of
employers to develop and harness the human capital
of the organisation
n at its core are task-level practices, i.e. methods for
working flexibly and producing innovations
n it involves two types of support practices: (a)
Some think it is not a benevolent form of management
but just makes workers work harder
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Table 1 Distribution of HI management practices
%
Team working 63
Functional flexibility 47
Quality circles 47
Suggestions scheme 34
Team briefing 83
Induction 79
Training for HR skills 45
Information disclosure 83
Appraisal 54
Survey feedback 29
Internal recruitment 25
Motivation as selection citerion 88
Job guarantees 11
in status difference 57
Variable pay 34
Source: WERS98
individual supports, through which individuals are
given training and information to engage successfully
in such practices; and (b) organisational-level
supports – practices, such as minimal status
differences and job security, which are directed at
the recruitment and retention of people able to work
in a high involvement manner
n if successful, it should result in employees being
flexible, expansive in their perceptions and willing to
contribute proactively to innovation
n it should thus have its most telling effect on rates of
productivity growth and in ensuring the simultaneous
achievement of high quality and high productivity.
Our research strategy has differentiated between examining
the nature of HR practice and examining its effects on
performance. (Previous research has concentrated on
effects.) More specifically, it has involved two elements:
(1) a detailed examination of the relationship amongst
practices associated with high involvement management,
total quality management and the strategic approach to
HRM; and
(2) an assessment of the performance effects of these
practices (with the results from (1) dictating how these
practices are conceived and measured). 
The 1998 UK Workplace Employee Relations Survey,
which we have used, is the fourth in a series of representa-
tive surveys of the UK economy. It has a greater coverage
of human resource management issues than past surveys.
Its virtue for our needs is that it contains measures of a
comprehensive range of high involvement and total quality
practices, as well as data on the strategic integration of
personnel management.
The high involvement management practices in WERS98
can be classified according to our three types:
(1) task-oriented practices: team working, functional
flexibility, quality circles and suggestion schemes; 
(2) individual-level supports: team briefing, induction,
training for human relations skills, information disclosure
and appraisal; 
(3) organisational-level supports: survey feedback, prior-
ity given to internal recruitment, motivation as a selection
criterion, job security guarantees, minimal status differ-
ences and variable pay.
Our results show that
n of the core task, high involvement practices, team
working is the most widespread (75%), followed by
quality circles and continuous improvement teams
(50%) and job flexibility (42%), with suggestion
schemes coming last (37%)
n core high involvement practices are no more likely to
be used in the private than the public sector
n core high involvement practices are systematically
used together and supported by practices that equip
employees to work in a participative way (measured
in WERS98 by team briefing, induction, information
disclosure, appraisal and training in group and
interpersonal skills)
n high involvement management is not necessarily
complemented by employment practices, such as 
job security guarantees, internal recruitment and
single status, which are not as common as high
involvement management
Employees should be considered as a resource rather than a cost
Management are not enhanced when internal
recruitment is favoured, job guarantees are offered,
or status differentials are minimised;
n the effects of High Involvement and Total Quality
Management are not contingent on personnel
management being strategically integrated, the
product market being unstable, or trade unions being
recognised. 
Finally, we also analysed these practices as if they were
“best practices”, by aggregating undifferentiated sets of
them. This analysis did not achieve the same telling
performance results. 
High Involvement Management is the foundation of human
resource management in Britain. Being task-centred, it is a
limited involvement. It clearly does not involve excessive job
enrichment and workplace democracy, as some sceptics
suppose. It is not based on Japanese-style employment
practices, with a heavy use of internal recruitment, guaran-
tees of job security and low status differentials between
management and workers. Indeed, when HIM is associated
with these characteristics, its effects on performance are
not enhanced. 
The high involvement management that we have analysed,
focused as it is on encouraging employees to be flexible,
expansive in their perceptions and willing contributors to
innovation, is integral to the notion of partnership put
forward by the Labour government and the TUC. The
evidence here indicates that its real value is in raising
productivity and overcoming the traditional conflict between
high quality and high productivity that managers and trade
unionists have faced in the past.
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n a philosophy of paying according to performance is
not part of HIM, so performance-related pay systems
(including employee share ownership and profit
sharing) are not necessarily associated with high
involvement management
n HIM is not part of a broader management concern
with employees’ well-being, as it is not associated
with family-friendly or equal opportunity policies
n high involvement practices are used in conjunction
with total quality or lean production practices, such
as the measurement and monitoring of quality and
customer requirements and complaints, training of
employees in problem-solving, and self-inspection
n the popular association of high involvement
management with high profile non-union firms, like
IBM, is not supported by these data (in fact high
involvement management is more likely in workplaces
where trade unions are recognised).
More sophisticated statistical analysis of the variables
involved allows us to point to other relationships:
n managements using core high involvement practices
in a concerted way are orientated towards enhancing
the involvement, development and contribution of
their employees;
n the proportion of workplaces across the whole
economy where managements have this high
involvement orientation is 26% (with 24% having no
such an orientation and the remainder being only
partially concerned with involvement);
n 38% of the UK workforce works in high involvement
workplaces and only 13% in “no involvement”
workplaces;
n almost all managements with a high involvement
orientation are also geared towards the achievement
of high quality. 
n such high involvement management is no more or
less likely to be in the private than in the public
sector;
n high involvement management is prevalent in large
workplaces and is allied to workplaces where
personnel management is integrated into the
strategic planning and objective setting of the
organisation.
From the data, the measurable effects of high involvement
management are discernable:
n strong positive effects on the rate of reported
productivity change (but not necessarily on the level
of productivity, quality or financial performance, nor
absenteeism and labour turnover);
n when allied with total quality management, it
strengthens the relationship between quality and the
level of productivity;
n organisations able to achieve high quality and high
productivity are disproportionately those practising
high involvement quality management ;
n the effects of High Involvement and Total Quality
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T
here is only one
economic reason to join
the Euro – that it would
give us greater
prosperity. To prosper
you need to belong to a
large market, free of
tariffs and non-tariff barriers and
undisrupted by currency fluctuations.
That is how the United States grew
rich. Its huge market enabled firms to
specialise and produce on a massive
scale at low cost. At the same time the
size of the market increased the
competitive pressure on firms to be
efficient and widened the range of
suppliers from whom consumers could
satisfy their needs.
In Europe, the Common Market,
followed by the Single Market, has
produced some of the same effects.
But, as experience has shown, you
cannot have a truly single market
without a single currency. So the Euro
is the coping stone of the Single
Market programme, which Margaret
Thatcher did so much to promote.
And it is having its predicted effect.
We are now seeing a major
reorganisation of European industry
and finance, achieving the economies
of scale already seen in the USA.
It is easy to underestimate the impact
of currencies upon economic life. If
(like some monetarists) you believe
that money is a veil, it is natural to
believe that efficient markets can
penetrate the veil. But businessmen
know otherwise. If your costs are in
sterling and your receipts in a foreign
currency whose value fluctuates
against sterling, you will be far more
cautious about committing yourself to
the foreign market.
A good example of how this works
comes from Canada, which shares a
common frontier and a common
language with the USA but not a
common currency. Canada trades far
less with the USA than geography
would lead one to expect. A Canadian
province trades one sixteenth as much
with a US state as it does with
another Canadian province that is
equidistant and of equal income. And,
because Canada is so weakly
integrated into the US market, its
productivity is 20% lower than the
USA’s. Likewise, Britain’s productivity
per hour worked is 20% below that
on the Continent north of the Alps.
Among the reasons is our lesser
integration into the large European
market. That began with our late entry
into the Common Market and it
continues with our delayed entry into
the Euro. After the War, European
productivity per hour was way behind
the US, but the Continent has now
caught up with the US. Britain,
however, lags and has grown no faster
than the Continent over the last 20
years, despite our economic reforms.
The separate currency is a major
reason for this and it will become
even more damaging in the future. If
you have a separate currency, its
value will fluctuate. This creates
uncertainty about the return to any
long-term investment in export
markets. The returns in the foreign
currency are already uncertain and,
since the currency risk cannot be
hedged, this adds further to it. On top
of this, currencies go through
prolonged periods of misalignment,
which are deeply damaging even
when foreseen. The level of sterling
over the last three years has been
extremely harmful and is one reason
why firms like BMW, Vauxhall and
Corus are rebalancing their
businesses away from Britain.
Such misalignments cannot be
controlled. For, in the modem world of
by Richard Layard
The status quo is
not an option
With the Euro now a physical reality, Richard Layard
argues that the economic case for Britain joining
Euro-land is overwhelming.
massive short-term capital flows, a
floating exchange rate does not serve
as a well balanced adjustment
mechanism, as its advocates claim.
Experience has shown that a floating
exchange rate produces much more
variation in competitiveness than
occurred in the Bretton Woods
period, when the exchange rate could
be fixed. As capital becomes ever
more mobile through electronically
linked financial markets, the exchange
rate is likely to fluctuate even more.
The simplest remedy is to link
ourselves to the currency of our
closest trading partners.
The argument would be strong in any
case, but it is even stronger when our
partners have already linked
themselves together. Before that
happened, we were in the same
position as any one of them. For
example, a firm that sold into
Germany faced exchange risk
whether it produced in Holland,
France, Italy or Britain. Now it faces
no exchange risk if it produces in
Holland, France, or Italy, but it does if
it produces in Britain. So the longer
we stay out of the Euro, the more
firms are likely to move their business
to the Continent. That is why so many
businessmen are urging the
government to join the Euro so that
they do not have to face that
agonising choice.
The key point is that, once the other
countries have linked up, we are no
longer in the same situation as
before. We cannot choose the
status quo ante. If we do not join,
we are in a worse situation than
before. So, even if we were happy
with our previous situation, we
cannot avoid a reassessment, now
that the Euro exists.
These are the central economic
arguments. But there is another
indirect one. Our economy is strongly
affected by what happens on the
Continent – by its level of economic
growth and by the regulations we
face from Brussels through our
membership of the EU. We want to
be able to influence these. We can
only influence growth in Europe by
belonging to the European Central
Bank, which sets interest rates on the
Continent. And we can better
influence European regulations if we
belong to the committee of the Euro
12 (the countries that belong to the
Euro). Increasingly, European
business is done within that group and
at present we are excluded from it.
That is the case in favour: to avoid
currency fluctuations, we must adopt
the single currency. But that also
means accepting the single rate of
interest on that currency. There lies
the rub: we lose control over our own
interest rates. So, if Britain faced a
shock that affected it differently from
other countries, it could not use
monetary policy to offset it. This is the
problem of “one size does not fit all”
and it is a serious disadvantage.
However, the same problem occurs
in the United States. If one region is
hit by an adverse shock, the Federal
Reserve can do little to help. Yet 
no one has proposed having separate
currencies for different parts of 
the US. 
So should Britain be as happy to use
the Euro as California is to use the
dollar? In this situation Britain’s main
drawback is that there is much less
labour mobility between Britain and
the Continent than there is between
California and the rest of the US.
Thus an adverse shock to Britain
would be harder to offset by an
exodus of population.
But there is also, of course, very low
net movement of labour within Britain.
Yet no one seriously advocates a
separate currency for the North-East
of England. Moreover, Britain has one
key advantage that California has not.
We have the freedom to run a budget
deficit. Though in the Euro we lose
our monetary weapon of stabilisation,
we still have our fiscal weapon. US
states have no such weapon, since
most of them have to balance their
budgets year by year. Thus, from 
the fiscal point of view, a European
country is better placed than a 
US state.
The opposite is often alleged. It is
said that California is better off than
Britain would be because, when
California’s economy plunges, it
gets an automatic transfer from the
federal budget in Washington. By
contrast, Britain would get no such
transfer from Brussels. However,
Britain does not need such a
transfer, because it has the
automatic stabilisers within its own
budget. These are stronger than
those in the US and Britain can, if it
chooses, use discretionary 
fiscal change on top of this to offset
a recession.
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There is one other point. The
California economy is very different
from the average of the US economy.
It is highly exposed to idiosyncratic
shocks, which the Federal Reserve
will not offset. By contrast, the
economy of Britain is more similar to
the overall economy of Europe than
the typical US state is to the
overall economy of the
United States. So
situations where our
interests diverge from
those of Europe as 
a whole should be 
relatively rare.
We must of course join the
Euro at a time when our
economy is at a similar
cyclical position point to the
European economy – i.e. when
we would like to have similar
interest rates. Sometime in the
next two to three years looks
ideal. But there are bound to be
times thereafter when British and
European interests diverge. 
That is the cost of joining in return
for the greater benefits of 
currency stability.
Let me end by reviewing some of
the less respectable arguments
against joining. First, there is the
argument that we should join the large
American market rather than the large
European one. In other words, join
the North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA), not the Euro. This is
absurd. For powerful economic
reasons, over 50% of our trade is
with the EU and only 16% with the
US. These powerful forces cannot be
bucked. Nor would the rules allow us
to join NAFTA and remain in the EU.
Second, there is the argument that
Europe is failing, so we should stay at
arms length. Europe has indeed one
serious weakness. France, Spain, Italy
and Germany all have higher
unemployment than we do. While
some of the difference is cyclical, an
important part is due to dysfunctional
benefit systems and rigid wage
structures, which need to be changed.
But joining the Euro does not mean
that we have to copy these countries.
Within the British single currency area,
the South-East has one third the
unemployment of the North-East. In
other words, the South-East has not
imported the unemployment rate of the
North-East. Within any single currency
area there will always be local
variations, but these are no reason to
break up the Union.
Third comes the argument that the
Euro would be a re-run of the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
On the contrary. The ERM was an 
ill-fated attempt to peg a separate
currency to other currencies. The
Euro is a decision to merge the
currencies so that exchange rates no
longer exist between them.
Fourth, perhaps the most strident
argument used against the Euro is
that it is the thin end of the wedge on
the route to a federal Europe in which
we shall be forced to harmonise
taxes and many other institutions
where we prefer our own variant.
There is in fact no such implication.
The Euro is a self-contained
arrangement concerning currencies.
Britain can continue to veto tax
harmonisation and most other
changes we dislike. This is governed
by the treaties we have signed, quite
irrespective of whether we belong to
the Euro or not. However, if we do
belong to the inner club of Europe, it
will in fact be easier rather than
harder for us to resist pressures of
the kind we disapprove of.
Finally, there is a common view
that, while we would be better off
inside the single currency, it is so
difficult to manage the transition
that we should not try. There are
of course formidable political
difficulties in persuading the
British people. But it can be
done. In the 1975 Common
Market referendum 55% of
voters were against
membership six months
before the referendum, but
only 33% were against it on the day.*
This time, the key conditions for
success will be strong business
support (which requires a reasonable
exchange rate) and a popular
government arguing clearly for a yes
vote in a referendum. If these are in
place, Britain will join the Euro sooner
than many people expect.
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al, The Case for the Euro, Britain in
Europe, 2000
* Robert M. Worcester, How to win the Euro
referendum, Foreign Policy Centre, 2000
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